Global morality and local cultures

THE EMERGENT GLOBAL HIERARCHY OF MORAL VALUES -- WEMOVAGLA STRADDLES LOCAL CULTURES

Note: Originally I presented a draft of this paper to the symposium in honour of my friend K.O.L. Burridge's 80th birthday which John Barker organized for the meeting of the Association for the Social Anthropology of Oceania in Vancouver February 2003. The ASAO plans to publish the papers. My own paper was based upon general knowledge, a tiny understanding of current conditions in Melanesia, and, perhaps more interestingly, material gleaned from the internet.

I hope therefore that any interested readers will feel my welcome and my desire to have them communicate comments and observations and anything else to me at cbelshaw@telus.net . When I discuss your ideas or incorporate them into this paper, of course your help will be acknowledged.

Also, the virtual paper attempts to constitute a template of a total study consisting of many sub-templates. This may sound objective, but it cannot be. Thus if your values, ideas and prejudices differ from mine, as they are bound to do, one challenge will be for you to alter the template to fit your values, ideas and prejudices as distinct from mine. Inform me, and, where possible, your alterations may be incorporated or put on line as a parallel text. There then may be a range of templates on which to draw.

Temporary note: During revision some existing paragraphs will be moved, which may lead to a (temporary?) lack of continuity

Replacing the former colonial insistence on certain moral values in their territories, there now exists a loosely knit-together global moral system, based on United Nations resolutions and global treaties. There is no equivalent system based on religious values, although religious activism plays a strong role, through NGOs, in the global moral system. Using the well established anthropological practice, I arbitrarily recognize this system as a culture for examination, and give it the tribal name of Wemovagla, which stands for the Web of Moral Values Globally Approved. The paper lists some of the moral values in Wemovagla.

The paper then suggests issues which arise as Wemovagla, the heir to colonialism, exerts pressure on national, political and local cultures to conform. As anthropologists, our stance, in general, has been to support local cultures come what may. We rightly consider that, when reforms are proposed, their ramifying effects throughout culture should be considered, understood, and taken into account. But this often leads to identifying the culture as systemically intact, in balance, and right. We are therefore confronted with major moral choices of our own, which we cannot escape, as we find Wemovagla identifying breaches of global ethics in local societies which can be characterized as “uncivilized”– from genocide to women’s status. What do we know about the processes of change and resistance which impinge on local societies? What is the local awareness of and attitudes towards of the norms of Wemovagla?

The nature of Wemovagla changes day by day as the result of world events, and most recently by the unilateralism of the United States. What applies to Melanesia is much stronger in other parts of the world, and some of my examples are non-Melanesian. Thus I feel that there is room for a continuation of the theme into the future, and more globally. For this the web is a near-perfect instrument. Without becoming a specialist scholar in this complex subject, I can nevertheless continue the discussion by continuously updating it as I find new material, and, more particularly, as colleagues and readers can argue with my points and draw my attention to new developments and appropriate information and ideas.

Any conversation with Ken Burridge about world issues reveals his firm beliefs. If the conversation is short, it may well be that the person to whom he makes his observations gets the impression that the statement is abrupt, quite often innovatively so. A longer conversation reveals that the abruptness and innovation, far from enabling the hearer to categorize Ken into some group of opinion, is but the tip of the iceberg on a subtle, serious, and long thought out position. That realization forces the hearer, however much he may on occasion disagree with Ken, to meet a methodical mind, and to rethink whatever it was heshe thought before.

My essay does not quite follow Ken’s oral paths – for one thing it is not nearly as systematic. But I hope it goes far enough to suggest ways of finding and approaching data that go beyond the conventional. Ken thinks “outside the box”. We should too.

As anthropologists our primary task is to understand. We are also abjured not to harm those we study. But, as a BBC Commentator put it recently, to understand is but a short step on the way to approve or to support.

The second precept puts the observer in dilemmas. “Those we study” are individuals who beat up their families, run afoul of the police, sometimes engage in clandestine politics. We can leave accounts of their activities out of our publications, generalize them, use pseudonyms, or otherwise hide their identities. By extension, “those we study” is our definition of the society itself – and I can think of several I do not approve of in their present format. Sometimes we hide the identity so that it is recognisable only to other professionals -- we hope.

We also become pro-active. We tend to identify with the (our?) people and their point of view. We defend them against the inroads of multinational corporations. We may bemoan the impact of what we now call “globalisation” in an overly ideological and portmanteau style. (It was such a conservative stance of anthropology in Africa that made it abhorrent to the revolutionary successors of the colonial masters – even those who had studied the subject at university.) We defend the customs of the people against attack, we take up metaphorical arms when their resources are threatened, we tell governments to lay off when legislating drastic change in the conditions and ways of life. We do not usually follow Malinowski’s precept: to study the other side of the equation, the institutions which are the outside agencies of change, with the same objectivity we hold precious when working with villages or ghettos.

Except. Except when somebody else’s people engage in behaviour which deeply offends our own sense of values, or those modern political ideals which we regard as fundamental - (fundamental to our own society? Fundamental to a Rousseauesque conception of what it is to be human? And by extension, thus morally good for everyone?). Such a reformist stance has at times to come into conflict with both precepts I set out in the first paragraph.

How then do we resolve the conflict? By extension, what questions might anthropologists ask when they relate the morality of the mini-societies they study to what is the only “natural” society – the global one? In approaching such questions I write with “common sense” knowledge, rather than “scholarly” knowledge, because the literature, mostly non-anthropological or anthropologically concerned with aspects of individual culture, is too immense for me at this stage.

It is my perception that the only “naturally-given” polity, society, or culture, is that which is global: all others are convenient artefacts of the observer. (We can draw our boundaries anywhere for the convenience of analysis, using whatever criteria, such as language or a political centre or a common profession, we find useful).

Strictly speaking, global morality consists of all the myriad moralities, together with their interactions, throughout the world. It may one day be possible to observe and analyze such a chaos, but for years to come, given the population size and predilections of anthropologists, that will not happen. Nor is what I am now drawing attention to.

In practical terms, what we have is a hierarchy of moral values, the hierarchy closely reflecting a hierarchy of political organisation. The “top” rank in this hierarchy consists of those moral values which are embodied in the law, practice and custom of world political authorities and organisations. The anthropological exercise will be to identify and define those artefacts and explain their organisation, operation and dynamic effects To do this we will be throwing an artificial analytical boundary around them, a boundary which must be defined and recognized.

At this point (as if there were no others!) there is an issue of terminology to confront. Given my personal predilections and political standpoint, I would like to call the unit so defined “civilized consensus” or even “civilized behaviour”. Without looking into your eyes I can immediately detect objections. Anthropologists have long resisted the use of the word “civilization”[1] because it has exclusive elitist connotations in popular language, and we rightly point out that Oceanic societies have their own forms of civilisation. It is ironic however that we do not have the same objection to the use of “culture”, which, until anthropology forcefully spoke out in favour of a comparative and inclusive perspective, had and has similar elitist connotations in popular language. (Perhaps this borrowing from ordinary speech contributes to the variations and confusions in the definitions of culture). If we talk of “global civilisation” it could become something to which we aspire as citizens of the world, which wouldn’t be a “bad” thing, and could lead to overt competition between moral values which have not yet entered the top hierarchical level. In popular language “civilization” implies not only a moral superiority but a superiority in moral style.[2]

Our method in anthropology is mostly based on concepts we try to define rigorously, but which, since they are borrowed from popular language, contain the baggage of long and varied use. Might we break with this tradition, and if so how? Let’s try The Web of Moral Values Globally Approved. Well, to get a short hand acronym out of that requires a bit more invention, so let’s try something like “Wemovagla”. Wemovagla is the network, the unit, of moral values globally sanctioned.

This enables us (does it?) to know that we have a boundary which contains the morality of Wemovagla, within which we can observe a cultural and social organisation, subject to a world polity, however fragmented. The nature of that fragmentation deserves a separate anthropological, as distinct from political science, study.

We are then in a position to notice internal and cross-boundary dynamics. At the moment, it is probable that the internal dynamics are the most mysterious to the observer. The United Nations family of organisations plus regional and global conferences which result in treaties with moral implications are there on the surface, and it goes without saying that those elements of national governments which participate in them are part of the organisation. Historians, political scientists and memoir writers reveal much of what goes on, which we then could interpret. Field work of a different kind.

But this is only part of the internal story. I once calculated that each substantive segment of the United Nations family of organisations, however small, would require at least three full-time officials to effectively carry out liaison, including “empire “ maintenance, with face to face meetings between international civil servants talking (often with deaf ears) to others from other units, in a massive and expensive effort to create liaison and coordination insisted upon by their masters, the national governments in concert. Some of this is part of the velocity of communication (when it is effective – an important part of the formula). In any event, it moves ideas within the system and results in actions and proposals which diffuse from one place to another. Concern about child abuse moves from, say, UNICEF to ILO to the Economic and Social Council, and so on. That, surely, opens up huge fields for participant observation???

It is interesting to note that the creation of Wemovagla’s moral system is formally carried out by political agencies. There is no parallel in religious organisation. There is no institution in which all world religions can meet to define and uphold a minimal global system of morality. A study in the ‘forties[3] examined the then available anthropological data on religious and moral philosophy world-wide and came to the conclusion that there was only one ethical precept common to all – “thou shall not harm another member of the community without reason.” Anything else, he asserted, could be found in this or that culture.[4] Wemovagla is asserting the globalisation of other precepts, but curiously, not that one, leaving it to local authorities. The above of course does not mean that religious views have no part – they certainly do, from the official presence of the Vatican in the United Nations to religiously based moral positions which have always been strong in the membership of those NGOs which have influence within the United Nations family, and on national governments.

In modern history a first answer to issues of law, based on moral concepts, came from the actions of colonial powers, frequently backed by missionaries. “Thou shall not kill” whether by sorcery, blood feud, conflict over land, jealousy, revenge. “Thou shalt not eat your fellow man or take his head”. “Thou shalt not burn widows”. “Thou shalt not enslave”. Instead of fighting thou shalt play cricket, a Malinowskian suggestion (the subject of recent discussion about the expansion of contemporary rivalrous games in New Guinea on the ASAO net). In the role as understanders, anthropologists sometimes explained breaches of such commandments as making sense and the commandments themselves as being fraught with disruptive consequences if followed. But in the light of Western public opinion they did not mount campaigns to have the laws repealed. Their views, such as they were, were considered to be far too conservative and morally dubious for then world, obsessed as it was about change.

The governments mostly recognised “custom” as legally and morally valid for the ruled people. The French created personal law, in which judgements were based on the moral precepts of the culture to which an individual belonged – leading to the idea that educated and acculturated Africans who left their birth culture to join the elitist ranks of the civil serve, professions, trade, universities became subject to French law. The Dutch, and to some extent the British, codified customary law, frequently with the help of anthropologists. (Some Dutch governors, as Van Baal in West Papua, were well known as anthropologists.) Where “custom” conflicted (the legal term “repugnant”, often used in statutes, simply meant conflict, not odiousness) with metropolitan law or moral ideas embodied in common law, the relevant precept could be incorporated in statute – as with the strengthening of adultery punishment in the Solomons - to conform with indigenous feelings. Governmental attitudes towards indigenous definitions of incest would bear examining. I seem to remember handing down judgements, as a District Officer, in cases where incest, Gela-style, was an issue. But the impact of Western morality had begun and was extended by missionary influences with respect to polygamy, nudity, and the like, an extension that anthropologists often criticised.

International law, most obviously on the seas where it began to be enforced by European and U.S. navies[5], attacked the slave trade (and also blackbirding) as the immoral treatment of humans. In the twentieth century, prior to World War II, the International Labour Organisation, which long preceded the United Nations, worked to establish global norms of employer-employee relations, including the abolition of slavery inside countries, and, less successfully, the support of trade union and bargaining rights and the restriction of oppressive child and female labour.

Genocide and ethnocide, which are now widely recognized as global crimes, were, until the holocaust, widely admitted as prerogatives of the State, or of armies. Perhaps the most recent pre-World War II examples included the actions which took place during the dying days of the Ottoman Empire. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the famous tolerance of the Ottomans, which made European peasants welcome Ottoman rule in preference to Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian feudalism, gave way to nationalist fervour as the Ottomans became Turks and in fear of aggression from Russia and the Western powers. Bulgarian Christians wiped out thousands of Muslims and in reprisal Turkish armies paid back in kind.

Much has been made of the massacre of hundreds and thousands of Armenians in 1915 on the xenophobic pretext that they represented a source of insurrection in the light of Russian advances along the south of the Black Sea. Although belatedly this is now a matter of international concern, at the time only the U.S. Ambassador to Istanbul paid it any attention. But it was not the first time.

In 1890, in the midst of the gradual and painful move of the Ottoman state to a Turkish state, Armenian nationalists began assaults on authority, brutally cut down with a massacre at Sasun in 1894,, culminating in massacres of Armenians in Istanbul in 1895-6.[6]

The failure of Turkish authorities to admit anything more than legal actions to put down revolt is a part now of the reluctance of the European Union to admit Turkey to full membership, and that reluctance has been reinforced by the refusal of the Turkish authorities, until very recently, to recognize Kurdish language and culture within its borders (this position is now being modified, though there is still passionate distrust of the possibility of an independent Kurdish state involving Kurds in Turkey, Iraq and Iran).

Prior to this a first major attempt to introduce the idea of justice into international law took place during the 1899 Peace Conference in The Hague. The delegates, wrestling with the principles by which arbitration, to avoid war, could operate, opened up the notion that decisions be based on justice, undefined because of the complexities of national power. The delegates, in the context of the time, could not find a practical way of limiting that power; furthermore – and this limitation has bedevilled us for over a century – the nation state was the only recognized locus of power and right. That this was uncontestable was brought home by the rejection of the appeal of a Boer delegation to have their case against Britain, since the delegation, along with Finns, Armenians, and Poles had no “official standing”.[7]

It took World War II, the holocaust, and the efforts of a Polish Jew, Raphael Lenkin, to change all that. Becoming an expert in international law, working from the United States and Britain, he assembled data about Jewish persecution in the Axis and its legal basis. His publication Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress[8].

In this treatise he defined “genocide” in a way that includes what we now call “ethnocide”, as “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves………………….Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. The imposition , in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and colonization of the area by the oppressor’s own nationals”[9][10]

An interesting dynamic surrounded the creation of the United Nations Convention Against Genocide[11]. The initiative came from public pressure on governments and the United Nations, largely as a result of Lenkin’s accurate forecasts and supportive information. Ironically (to us now) the original formulation spelled out the protection of Christian communities from destruction, even though the man usually credited for the initiative was of Jewish background. To the credit of the conference that formulation was quickly and successfully argued to be broadened to apply to any people, any culture, but without including the dimension of ethnocide. However I do not know of any study which analyzes the total dynamics which brought about the changed result. Imagine the propaganda value to terrorists and others of like mind if the original formulation had prevailed !

Although there has been literature investigating the less punitive forms of slavery and its societal functionality in particular contexts, and although we know that to reform systems of employment of children and women (including the advancement of women into the professions) cannot be achieved without major changes in fundamental values and systems, with consequent, often unknown, articulations through culture, few anthropologists defend breaches in such Western-imposed moral positions. Although there are limits to the profession’s more general philosophical position – that, somehow, we not only understand but represent even endorse the point of view of our subjects, whom we often regard as our friends – when it comes to such universalist moralities our positions, tensed by our own individual values, becomes at least ambiguous.

And the strength of international opinion undermines much of the relativist position of anthropology. There were anthropologists who in thought and deed were at least sympathetic of Nazi genocide, just as there may be some now (I have no information) who are critical of the use of the concept of ethnocide in all instances. But today, is there an anthropologist anywhere who supports genocide, even in the midst of terrorism????? Is this a first step for scientific anthropology on its was to joiningWemovagla?

Today, under the influence of the United Nations family of organisations, pressed mostly by Western governments, one aspect of globalisation is the imposition on nations of certain Western ideas and moral positions, backed by new legal instruments and the use of force. (It is interesting to note that very few, if any, moral precepts derived from non-western cultures have reached global endorsement, unless also present in Western approved thought. One possible exception is gaining ground – the idea that criminal justice is in fact civil justice and to be dealt with by reciprocity, restitution and healing, rather than punishment)[12]. When we state these positions abstractly, most of us are in agreement. When they are applied, their approval is subject to political positions and arguments as to fact and responsibility. Thus the Balkans.

Hence now genocide and to some extent its partner ethnocide are immoral and subject to sanctions. Even heads of state, formerly out of the reach of the law, are conceived to be subject to it.[13] Anthropologists approve because on the surface this seems to be consistent with our defence of victimized systems and our desire to rescue them as intact as possible. We can now refer to the dysfunctional elements within larger polities which destroy the functional elements in subject cultures. And, if we are objective, we can note that the individual powers of states to defend their policies solely in terms of self-interest are very slowly waning. (The United States is an obvious and sad hold-out[14])

It is notable that after 9-11 national policies against terrorism became international, even if we can argue that not all countries or peoples agree with the U.S. position in the matter. The definition of terrorism, as distinct from accepted political struggle by violent means is not agreed. Kashmir, Tamil Tigers, Kurdistan, ?Honiara ?Fiji. In the United States the moral hatred of terrorism has not extended to the use of other violent and official instruments within the country, and has justified the severe modification of the principles of liberty which have been, until now, the most cherished of founding moral positions. It has now slipped over into a belief that fundamentalism (Islamicist, not Christian) is immoral and dangerous, and, in policy, that persons born in certain countries are to be treated as potentially violently immoral and criminal until proven otherwise. International morality takes time to achieve acceptance, and has many twists and turns. Rules justifying accepted self-defence can twist easily into the removal of long held liberties – contradictions in moral systems, especially those which are created ad hoc for short term manipulation, are numerous.

Global public opinion is coalescing around the issue of respect and opportunity for women, despite the apparent religious sanctioning of restrictions. Slavery and child labour still exist, defended by specious definitions, secrecy, and, in the case of children, the material interests not only of the employers but of children’s families.

Throughout this history, non-governmental organisations have played a major part. Quakers and the Anti-Slavery League, composed of men and women who sometimes were slave owners themselves, fought the anti-slave trade, and ultimately the anti-slavery, battle. Today, NGOs are more numerous and powerful, and even individuals purportedly acting alone can mobilize public opinion, mostly in the West. After all, the United Nations family of organisations provides them with forums, consultative status (yes, we anthropologists, through the IUAES, have consultative status with UNESCO), and opportunities for demonstrations and publicity.

Some have a global reach and influence. “Thou shalt not threaten the integrity of nature, and thou hast a responsibility to protect endangered species” has, within thirty years, become a moral position taught in schools throughout the Western world, even if the application of the precept is the subject of fierce debate. The debate seldom challenges the idea overtly, but concentrates on the consequences if it is treated as universally and uncompromisingly applicable. Many Third World countries consider it to be easy for the West, damaging for them, and imperialist secret-colonial.

Others come into the global arena as a result of fervently held moral positions which assert that there is a higher morality which overlays individual ethnic, religious or national moralities. There is no need for me to describe the most dramatic, since the press makes sure that you know about them, at least in some fashion. Here’s a brief list of privately supported positions which have implications for international morality, if not yet always subject to international courts. In other words, national governments are urged to take action as a result of the pressure of international., not necessarily national, public opinion.[15] The internationality of such public opinion is its major strength.

The judicial rape of a woman whose brother has committed a crime, by the judges, is totally abhorrent.

The stoning of women for adultery is bad, especially when the accused is pregnant and the male partner is let off.[16]

The overthrow of a constitutional government by military means is wrong (Fiji, Solomons).

Bride-burning, dowry where it leads to bride-burning, and preferences for male children are wrong.[17][18]

Imprisonment without charges, access to legal aid, or trial is wrong. (Guantanamo?)

Democratic elections are right, though the definition of democracy is vague at best.

Corruption is wrong. BUT since when has gift giving between enterprises not been a price of business? AND how does this fit with reciprocity systems?

Human rights are sacred. This, because the term is so widespread and used in so many different contexts, requires special comment.

What are human rights? Is the concept, however defined, universal? In an internet discussion group a philosopher who is writing on the subject, recently addressed the latter question to anthropologists, who answered quite clearly, no. It is a Western idea of relatively recent origin and very recent power. Human rights ideas are partially embodied in parts of Judeo-Christian-Muslim lore, and are presumably embodied in Buddhist conceptions of the sanctity of life in general. In both instances practice has frequently denied them. ( Crusades, anti-semitism, martial Buddhist priests, Islamicist terrorism).

What we do get much more frequently is the precept that one should take care of one’s own - family, clan, tribal group, nation – and beggar take the others. Sometimes the self-descriptive word for a cultural group has been translated as “people” or “humans” with others being defined as non-people or non-human. I must say I take such translations with a grain of salt, but whatever they might be they indicate a boundary between “we who are significant” and “they who are not possessed of our characteristics”. The support of custom, common morality, approved behaviour, applies to us, not to them. We can in fact kill or rob them and molest their women.

For the most part such limited conceptions have passed under the sway of wider government, organized religion, education and cultural networks. But political movements can still call upon the sanctity of the identity which is ours, and the devilish identity which is theirs. Is this not what George W. Bush is manipulating? And it continues with great force is those areas where blood feud, revenge, and the like are regarded not only as worthy but a duty. What now is the place of revenge in Melanesia, though modified by the reciprocal implications of restitutional exchange? At what point in the cultural boundaries is restitutional exchange overlaid by revenge?[19]

What is now happening is that voices are being raised in almost all parts of the world for the embodiment of human rights in practice as well as in law. By and large human rights ideas embody most of the precepts I identified above as international. They tend, with greater or lesser inclusiveness, to be brought together in a sort of code which makes much of the principle that the human mind and body are inviolable, and must be treated as sacrosanct even when the body in question has committed a crime. The major international tribunal which enforces human rights qua human rights (as distinct from punishing crime) is the European Tribunal for Human Rights. To the other principles is being added non-discrimination on the basis of sex, religion and political belief.

Heather Young Leslie pointed out in a 2002 email message on ASAO Net that she discussed the concept of “freedom” when she visited Tonga that July. Human rights and freedom are, in the West, closely related. An attack on human rights is an attack on human freedom. Tongans defined freedom in terms, essentially, of being able to lead a serene quality of life.[20] One of the difficulties in making such comparisons is to be able to credibly manipulate the variables to determine, whether, if there were greater inroads of “the American Way of Life” other elements would be added to the present Tongan notion. The validity of moral precepts depends very much on the particulars of the global environment.

Such variables also influence the acceptance, rejection, or neutral position of major global moral initiatives. How do Tongans reconcile their notion of freedom with Bush’s Axis of Evil, which must seem to be something in a far away Utopia gone Dystopia.[21]

It will of course not stop with Europe. Individual countries such as Canada have their own codes. More importantly there are well respected NGOs such as Amnesty International[22] which exert pressure, focussing on a limited number of issues. And there are numerous other organisations managing to watch for and protest against abuses in the name of human rights. This has become a force for moral globalisation.

There is perhaps no more emotionally and politically charged and culturally inhibited proposition than that women should have equal rights to those of men in every walk of life. If the family, however defined, is at the heart of every society, then every tampering with it, however small, has major repercussions for the hierarchical, ultimately political, structure, for fundamental philosophical, cultural and practical ideas about an ethical way of life, moral purpose, and both societal and individual self-respect and identity.

The permutations and combinations of factors in the nexus are pretty well infinite. In the Western World, individual women sometimes had great political and cultural power, and in the aristocracy, church and commerce are even now icons of history. To this, add, even in patriarchal societies, private influences women brought to bear through status and property (even in the poorer classes), networks, personality and argument, and genius. Outside the West, this was also often the case[23].

This of course was a far cry from the formal gender equality that not only feminists but Wemovagla itself demand as a moral right. The practical “battle” still continues in the West, though the principle is almost universally admitted.

But in other societies the principle may not be admitted at all. And it can come headlong into conflict with the other principle, the moral right of a people to have their own culture, including religion.

Wemovagla has elements which push for gender equality with strength and vehemence, coming up time and again against contrary or subtly modifying oppositions. The list of conferences and discussions has been almost continuous since the initial treaties on human rights. In 1992 Wemovagla sponsored the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, which led to a Committee on the Status of Women having an important impact on the 1993 UN Conference on Human Rights. This in turn led to the formulation, for example, of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, which the U.N. General Assembly adopted in 1994.[24]

Advocates have made it clear that in their opinion women’s rights, like those of children, are a special case. Because of the very intimacy of the social relations concerned, and because human rights tend to be thought of in terms of political freedom gender equality produces different kinds of consideration.

The issue of violence against women is a special case of equality. Advocates do not subsume it under the more general heading of “violence against human beings” (including children). So far as I know violence against men by men or women, as distinct from violence against men by the state or official institutions, is not yet part of Wemovagla’s position.

There are sound anthropological reasons for this. Granted that men and women are different from each other, both individually and generally, equality in the sense of indistinguishable identity is not the issue. That means that the ethnography of equality is all important – the concepts, the detailed application, and the socio-cultural ramifications. Anthropologists above all others should be the ones detailing the specific issues and societal interconnections. Also violence against women tends to happen in the family (including affinal family) circle, whereas violence involving men usually takes place without it. It is thus not only a matter of law and policing but of the most intimate behaviour.

There is thus under way a considerable change in the hierarchical structure of moral cultures. No longer can a person, considered “immoral” to the point of criminality, maintain innocent impunity on the grounds that the act was part of national or tribal custom. Ironically, this trend is coming about at the same time as courts within local jurisdictions will temper the force of a national law on the ground of the special circumstances of a minority culture. There is even room for small-scale indigenous practices, such as healing circles, to be adopted into the wider juridical frameworks. While the influences are mostly one-way, they are not entirely so.

To return to the hierarchy itself. Just as in ethnography we note the reality of the application of moral precepts by the arguments presented in cases of conflict, so we read the texts of international morality where courts take cognisance of disputes: but we attempt to assess the dynamics of the growth of application by noting the manifestations and counter-arguments of numerous protest and advocacy groups. They are still predominantly Western[25], but also grow up within individual countries and cultures and it is notable that indigenous activists often get their ideas and support through residence in Western countries. Comparative ethnographic studies of these would give us much information about the interaction between the hierarchies of values, and data on the dynamics of innovation.

For what we have here is innovation, once, in the form of social and cultural change, a major preoccupation of anthropology. We tend to study the dynamics of innovation within the bounds of what we observe as “cultures” (pace “societies or polities”). My own approach to innovation, for which I shall not argue here but only attempt to use, states, among other things, that innovation is a recognisable cultural event, which means that it must be adopted by more than one person. It is in two parts. The first is a new concept or idea (in this context moral position) which may or may not have a material consequence. Such concepts or ideas (even with “discoveries”) consist in the recombination of existing concepts (internal or of external origin) in a manner which results in a new entity. This may of course exist in the head of one person, in which case if it remains there it is not culturally adopted. For that to take place it must be communicated to others and accepted by them, during which process it may be further adapted.

Given the anthropological predilection to consider events and data within cultural boundaries, it follows that this method gives us clues about the dynamics of, or propensity toward, innovation in given cultures. The volume of innovation within a given boundary is dependent on the size of the cultural stock modified by the velocity of circulation of ideas and concepts (i.e. speed of communication). The greater these two factors, the greater the rate of innovation[26].

But boundaries have never been impermeable. What earlier anthropologists called diffusion was the result of a process by which concepts and ideas moved across boundaries. It follows that the greater the penetration of boundaries, the greater the rate of culturally accepted innovation.

A key variable in all this is the process by which the individual’s “new” becomes accepted or rejected or modified by others as it attempts to enter the culture. I will not set out here the range of propositions which I believe describe this process, but assert that it is central to any anthropological theory of society and/or culture.

Regrettably, the United States under the Bush administration and its “war on terror” has emerged as the world’s greatest and most powerful objector to the principles of Wemovaglan ethics. This has many facets, which, taken together and in the light of other policies, amount to a concerted and deliberate theme: “World government is not for us, but for everyone else (unless we turn a blind eye to their transgressions).”

The most obvious and dangerous is the United States’ adoption of the right of per-emptive strike without United Nations’ sanction. This is already copied by Israel, which indeed may in practice have invented the concept. When the United Nations refused to sanction the United States’, Britain’s and Australia’s pre-emptive strike on Iraq, many pundits ranted that this showed the United Nations’ ineffectiveness and irrelevance. Not so. It strengthened the moral force of the United Nations and, at least in much of world public opinion, subsequent events and information have reinforced the view that the United Nations Security Council was both morally, legally and practically correct.

The arrest of Saddam Hussein illustrates very clearly the tension between Wemovagla and local moralities. Insofar as the United Nations system endorsed an international code of justice, it is clear that, in accordance with the rules of most Western nations, it does not admit the death penalty. For analytical purposes, United
States culture is in these terms local. Both the United States and Iraq are behind Wemovagla in this respect and operate with the death penalty. President Bush has made it clear that this is the penalty he would prefer. If he or the Iraqi authorities follow through with that policy they will alienate most of the components of Wemovagla. Politically, this will give Islamisists a baton with which to beat the procedures.

There will be similar problems if Hussein were to be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. Where would he be gaoled for security and acceptance?

And there is a growing movement for restorative instead of retributive justice. This is normal in many small cultures, but is only at an elementary stage in Western countries, and is certainly not yet a Wemovagla principle. Furthermore, in many Mille Eastern countries and Iraq the principle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, in short, revenge, is localized. That would lead to a death penalty on conviction, even at the risk of martyrdom. (It would do nothing to stop continuing internecine violence).

In one’s imagination , a “restorative” solution would have Hussein sentenced to helping families identify their loved ones at ceremonies, praying there for forgiveness, visiting areas of massacre, prostrating himself in apology, labouring hands on in the meanest of labouring work on development or re-building projects, attending an praying at re-burial ceremonies, even public exposure at the location of the crimes, periods of guided reflection under imam supervision, and much more[27]. The humiliation would be a much greater deterrent to other would-be tyrants than mere death.

It is natural that the Iraqis would with to handle the trial themselves. But many of the charges against Hussein are likely to fall into the category of international crimes – against humanity, genocide and the like. Which should take precedence, Wemovagla or Iraq? Does Wemovagla justice preclude parallel additional procedures according to Iraq morality? Such issues are not, so far as I know, settled internationally.

Almost equally dangerous for the cause of world human rights are attacks on due process in the name of “the war against terrorism”[28]. Among many, the detention of prisoners at Guantenamo Bay for years without charge or trial, access to lawyers, or supervision by United States’ courts, is the most obvious and dramatic.

In November 2003 the BBC reported comments by Lord Steyn, a British law lord[29]:

“Lord Steyn said conditions at Camp Delta were of "utter lawlessness", in a speech seen by Channel 4 News. The Law Lord said the US was guilty of a "monstrous failure of justice" and challenged UK ministers to condemn the decision to hold any prisoners there. He said detainees were "beyond the rule of law, beyond the protection of any courts and at the mercy of victors"………

He is reported to have said ministers must condemn the holding of all 660 prisoners at the base, not just those from the UK. "The procedural rules do not prohibit the use of force to coerce the prisoners to confess," he said. Lord Steyn quoted officials as saying: "It's not quite torture but at close as you can get." He said the quality of justice did not comply with international standards for fair trials. "It may be appropriate to pose a question - ought our government to make plain publicly and unambiguously our condemnation of the utter lawlessness at Guantanamo Bay?"

Lord Steyn said that the blanket order issued by President Bush had deprived the detainees of "any rights whatsoever". "As a lawyer brought up to admire the ideals of American democracy and justice I would have to say that I regard this as a monstrous failure of justice."

It is rare for British judges to speak on contentious political issues and almost unheard of for them to attack a foreign government, BBC diplomatic correspondent Barnaby Mason said.

So far courts in the United States have ruled that they have no jurisdiction over the detainees since Guantanamo Bay is not American territory. However, earlier this month, the US Supreme Court agreed to hear appeals on the legality of the detentions. A ruling is expected by the end of June. “ The judgement of the Supreme Court will be posted here – it is not anticipated until the second trimester of 2004.

The United States characterizes the prisoners as “enemy combatants” not prisoners of war. Who, though, is the enemy? President Bush has defined his actions as a war (on terrorism). If it is a war, and these people are thought to have participated on the side of the enemy, then they must surely be prisoners of war. You can’t have it both ways. In case of doubt, the Geneva Convention provides for an independent tribunal to decide. The United States has refused to do this. In other words, the United States does not recognize “independent” international rulings when they may go against its policies. From this perspective, the United States is a rogue state similar to those President Bush targets.

I do not know how many Melanesian States are signatories to, or have ratified, the various conventions than constitute the main part of the morality of Wemovagla, nor do I know to what extent they take into consideration common international law. Are they aware that their political leaders, for example, are no longer immune from prosecution if charged with crimes against humanity? That the morality of their actions may be judged by Wemovagla agents, not only by the people of their country?

External judgement played a big part in the history of the recent Fijian coup. The opponents of the external judgement and its consequent actions could easily expose it as latter day colonialism, since it consisted of ad hoc positions outside the formal framework of Wemovagla. It is, however, writing on the wall. Only in scale and the nature of the instruments at play does it differ from the pre-war pressure on Iraq. Such pressures may or may not advance the coherence of the Wemovagla’s moral system, but the justifications used have a bearing on common international law – that part of international law which depends on precedent rather than formal conventions. Thus what happens in Melanesia can have far reaching implications for the world at large.

Inside the worlds of Melanesian cultures, it is clear that cross-boundary processes are of enormous significance. As distinct from Wemovagla, religious enterprise has been at the forefront but highly segmented without political unity, and its effects have been noted in some of the other papers in this symposium.

Apart from that there is the influence of international advisers (which can perhaps be exaggerated) on government agencies, who must, on occasion, refer to the Wemovagla morality in their advice – for example, on the education of women. Both subtly and overtly the effects of volunteer aid workers is of considerable possible significance, and deserves specific study. And, recognize it, so are the views of anthropologist field workers who, in a spirit of friendship and reciprocity, discuss local and world issues and raise questions which might otherwise not be asked[30].

I recall the aid project in the Solomons in which drama was (is??) being used to alert women and their villagers to issues of feminine freedom and dignity. How did this happen? Did the government initiate such a project? If so, how did it arrive at its interest in the subject? Was it part of the country’s acceptance of international conventions on the status of women? Was the government persuaded that the status of women was a Wemovagla moral position to which the Solomons should, ethically, subscribe? Was it, as so often happens, just a question that the government department involved in accepting the aid needed to show external income on its balance books and thus that the aid agency respected it, with consequences within the competitive bureaucracy? Was it none of these, but a persuasive international adviser? And are Melanesian communities actually technically in breach of such conventions – perhaps they are not. What do the women feel about suggestions they need more equality?

And then of course the consequent question. What effects did the activity have on the moral system of the participants – and on other parts of the social system, the relations between men and women, the nature of marriage? Wemovagla uses subtle methods, not always embodied in the formal conventions.

Another pervasive example is of course sustainability and the preservation of the environment. It is a romantic myth that indigenous peoples are, just because they are indigenous, imbued with a naturally given respect for the environment. Symbiotic relationships are often oriented to short-term exploitation, a dominant factor in human aggression and migration over the centuries. Where the relationship with the environment is positive, it is fragile and can change easily – and once changed it is extremely difficult to modify it toward sustainability again. The very concept may be foreign to the moral world of the people, replaced by individual expansion at the cost of others, and panic over possible failure. Thus the latter day destruction of shore line and lagoon shellfish resources in parts of the Solomons[31].

Wemovagla may be surprised at this, since it can so easily assumed that clan, lineage, and other structures hold back individual exploitation at the cost of others. The numerous ethnographic references to the social sanctioning of Big Men who mis-use their mana, to higher income people paying off their relatives to avoid counter-sorcery and jealousy, even to the community resistance of one-time mining for quick income versus favoured longer term mining with reduced but steady annual output, suggests important sanctions on too much material success, unless a social cost is paid through the entrepreneur meeting fully his social obligations.

Thus raiding the shell resources may help an individual gain social status through reciprocity, It may represent the entry of non-Wemovagla external values into the moral system – if I just let the shells lie undisturbed someone else will get them, so it may as well be me. It may represent an opportunity for Wemovagla to step in and present its moral stance of sustainability – which may in this case require changes in ownership rules.

However fragmented and uncoordinated its social organisation, Wemovagla is with indigenous peoples, including those of Melanesia, to stay[32][33]. On the surface it seems to be more of a one way influence, top down, than the reverse, but that has often mistakenly been said, and modified by reverse example. And such reverse example seems to be in moral areas where resistance to reform is likely strong, and where there are likely to be extensive articulations, and where the upper hierarchical moralities have found that their own applications are defective..

The discussion raises issues for observation, and analysis. Is my impression correct that the ethnographic material is relatively sparse? In view of the huge out put now in Melanesian studies that impression is probably quite wrong. We have not answered the paper’s question – what are the interactions between Melanesian societies and Wemovagla, however indirect? And what principles and regularities are embedded in them? How does this change the way we take into account the dynamics of culture?

[1] See Sandall, Roger The Culture Cult – Designer Tribalism and Other Essays” Westview Press, Boulder Colorado 2001 esp. Ch.9 “Civilisation and its Malcontents”

[2] Globe and Mail - At stake is nothing less than the fight of the civilized world against international terrorism, irrational fanaticism and inhuman crime.

[3] Unfortunately I have lost the reference. The author was a philosopher in the University of Edinburgh, if memory serves me correctly.

[4] I have not investigated whether the Human Resources Area Files would or would not justify his position.

[5] In a stance that has a contemporary ring, the United States opted out of a convention which would have permitted other navies to inspect ships carrying the U.S. flag, which established a major loophole in controlling the trade.

[6] Cf. Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, London, Jonathan Cape, 1977

[7] Jones, Dorothy V. Toward a Just World, Chicago, University of Chigao Press, 2002 pp. xii - 3

[8] New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 1944

[9] Op. cit., p.79

[10] For the discussion of Lenkin, and the quotations, I have relied on Power, Samantha A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, New York, Basic Books, 2002

[11] You may obtain information at http://www.magnacartaplus.org/uno-docs/genocide.htm

[12] Burridge’s “return to amity”. Note particularly the court cases described in the Errington-Gewertz paper

[13] Posted on H-Genocide 30 Jan 2003: The precise definition of Genocide is found in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998. It also follows the definition in the Genocide Convention.

Article 6 of the Rome Statute describes Genocide precisely as follows:

"For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group such as:

(a) killing members of the group

(b) causing seriously bodily or mental harm to members of the group

(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part

(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group

(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."

This definition was maintained in its exact form by the ICTY, ICTR and ICC statutes, while the Trial Chamber of the ICTR has provided more clarification to the various aspects of this definition. For instance, acts of bodily or mental torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, rape, sexual violence, and persecution are included within the term "causing serious bodily or mental harm", or subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from their homes and deprivation of essential medical supplies below a minimum vital standard would fall under (c) above.

As with war crimes and crimes against humanity any person whether connected to a state or not can be a perpetrator of genocide. The crime of genocide is also a crime against humanity, while crimes against humanity may not necessarily be a crime of genocide. International jurisprudence also needs to be considered in prosecuting those charged with the crime of genocide ……………….

Gary Komar

Hearings and War Crimes Investigations

Citizenship and Immigration Canada

[14] As I revise this text at the end of Marsh 2003, the Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, has made the extraordinary statement that one of the ground for withholding Canadian participation (of which I approve)_ in the aggressive alliance is that to remove Saddam Husein from power is an unjustified interference in the internal affairs of a nation. Admittedly there is now growing international pressure, which Britain supports, that he should be tried by an impartial court and not unilaterally by the United States. This shifts the burden of proof largely from that of “aiding terrorism” to “a crime against humanity” through the bloody suppression of his own people. But, see the International Criminal Court below.

[15] Of course there are major omissions in Wemovagla’s moral culture. One instance suffices – the lack of arms control, save for nuclear and chemical weapons, an omission which had led to chaos in parts of Africa, and is now insinuating itself into Melanesia. Is it not moral and ethical to insist on the development of a complete global registry or arms production and distribution?

[16] There are few clearer instances of outside organisations and pressures being brought to bear on a national system of law and religion on moral and human rights grounds. Quotations from http://www.mertonai.org/amina/ The Federal Government seems to deliberately deliver two contradictory speeches for internal and international audiences. Despite reassurances by President Obasanjo, the Government is still failing to take effective measures to ensure that the new Shari’a penal legislation is in line with the Nigerian constitution and the country’s obligations under international human rights instruments." – Amnesty International.

The judge ruled that 31-year-old Amina Lawal will be executed once she has weaned her eight-month-old daughter. The date of the second appeal hearing is still to be announced.

In the meanwhile, Fatima Ushman and Ahmadu Ibrahim (31) whilst in prison serving their original adultery sentence and without their knowledge were sentenced to death by stoning for adultery. Fatima pregnant at the time has now a baby girl and the couple released on bail with the help of human rights groups have appealed against the sentence. (as of 03 Feb 03)

[17] In January 2003, Dr. Enrica Garzilli, Shri Himendra Thakur, Dr. Malaya Khaund and Ms. Sian Hawthorne organized the 6^th International Conference on Dowry, Bride-Burning and Son Preference in Delhi, supported by the Centre for Gender and Religious Research at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London; the Internationl Society Against Dowry and Bride-Burning in India, the Asiatica Association of Italy; All India Marwari Yuva Manch; and the Delhi Assam Association. The announcement includes the following:

“The primary topic under discussion is ‘bride-burning’, that is, dowry-related deaths whether these are classified as murder or suicide. The theme of the Conference is ‘To Change the Mind-Set’. Our purpose is to persuade local and national leaders to draft and implement plans that will put a stop to dowry-related deaths.”

It is interesting for anthropologists to note that the orientation is toward the use of authority and education, but does not directly address the deep-rooted and resistant ethos, moral systems, and social organization to the “delinquent” societies – the very issues which need to be addressed before reform has a chance of success.

[18] It is becoming apparent that female foeticide with modern technology had already caused a major distortion in sex rations in the Punjab and Haryana, such that young males are forced to buy brides from other parts of Indian and even Pakistan. (B.B.C World TV. 03 Feb 03)

[19] A fascinating topic to me is the creation of wider state loyalties and identities which overlay the group or tribal ones. On the one hand the relative distance of the state stimulated the re-envigoration of more local cultural identifiers (e.g., in Europe, minority languages, carnaval, sports and much more). Perceived injustices to a minority create re-identification (in Iraq Shia v. Shi’ite, Ba’ath v. non-Ba’ath, Kurds; in the Solomons Guadalcanal v. Malaita). Yet, much to the dismay of U.S. generals (as I write) the attack on Iraq has created a major will to defend the country, irrespective of differences, except those which involve the Kurds.

[20] While in Tonga this July, I had several conversations with villagers on the subject of "freedom", generally initiated by them and usually related to the subjects of work, lifestyle & modernity. It is interesting that for them, 'freedom' is not associated as it is in the USA, with democracy, freedom of speech, choice of commodities & services, and the right to defend one's way of life, even on foreign soil; Tongan's sense of freedom is related more with low levels of individual stress, strong sense of personal security, absence of a compulsion to make 'big' decisions, and few actual 'big decisions' to be made (on a daily basis) in general. – Heather Young Leslie

[21] Much confusion has been caused by President Bush’s statement that included South Pacific countries in the Alliance of the Willing. He Prime Minister of the Solomons immediately denied that the Solomons was a member. Correspondents in the ASAO net indicated that Tonga had indeed joined and that Samoa’s public opinion was about evenly divided, but that the country has not joined. In view of the fluidity in such positions, and the variety of pressures (with Australia going one way and New Zealand the other, let alone the material incentives which the U.S. can offer) it would be unwise to consider the position less than synamic.

[22] It would be interesting to track the use and application of the idea of “amnesty” throughout history, since the Greek adoption of the word to mean “the forgetting of past acts”. Today, “forgetting” is hardly possible, if it ever was. I do not recall the use of the word, although “pardon” is close, in mediaeval times.

[23] Cf. discussion of women’s power in the patriarchal society of Fiji, in my Under the Ivi Tree London and Berkeley, Routledge and University of California Press, 1964, to be re-issued in the Routledge series Classics in Anthropology, 2004.

[24] See Merry, Sally Engle, “Changing Rights, changing culture”, in Cowan, Jane.K. et al, Culture and Rights: Anthropological perspectives, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 36-7

[25] I realize that I have been ethnocentric here. Demonstrations in the Arab world have indeed influenced debates in the United Nations, through the positions of Arab governments, but not yet had much influence on international moral positions. This may well be about to change.

[26] We may argue that the Melanesian field of innovation was religious and “artistic”. The great variety of religious detail between Melanesian societies is in contrast to the relative uniformity in practical material culture, and suggests innovation and modification over time. For the formula, cf. my The Conditions of Social Performance London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, 1970,

[27] I realize of course that this would involve massive security measures which might be impractical under certain of these circumstances.

[28] Canadian citizens, including an internationally known novelist travelling on a book promotion, have been harassed, not at the border, but at domestic airports on suspicion provoked by the colour of their skin. Although I personally do not anticipate more than the usual difficulties entering the United States, on principle I do not wish to do so while my fellow-citizens can be treated in this way.

[29] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3238624.stm

[30] This aspect of field work could be the subject of a symposium, and also of an unorthodox field enquiry amongst the peoples who have taken field workers into their midst !

[31] See, for example, the work of Simon Foale

[32] The Errington-Gewertz paper dealing with the moral notion of “amity” among the Chambri, provides a case study of the ways in which Wemovagla notions of due process, mediated through the government of Papua New Guinea, result in an interplay between customary moral principles and the introduced courts system, the latter replacing traditional problem-solving methods.

[33] An email in January 2003 points out the potential difficulty when Wemovagla insists that a State government full obligations as its agent:…..Subject: African Rights assessment of Rwanda¹s gacaca justice project ____

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Rwanda in July 1994 was a country with no money, no administration, no infrastructure, 10% of its population was dead and 70% displaced, and goodness knows how many genocide perpetrators. Unable to create a criminal justice system to deal the 130,000 arrested alleged perpetrators the government created the 'gacaca' [semi-traditional and localized] system of justice - here, seven months after pilot gacaca trials started is an assessment of what it means in practice.

African Rights concludes in an upbeat note :

"it would be unrealistic to expect the trials in and of themselves to deliver prompt and complete answers to the administration of genocide justice. Several hurdles lie ahead. The report discusses some of the issues the government will have to confront, including further training, public education, security, poverty and the demand that ³revenge killings² committed in the aftermath of the genocide, be prosecuted in gacaca courts. But the process itself matters enormously. Gacaca brings together the people of Rwanda in a spirit of equality and openness, empowering them to influence their society for the better. Properly implemented it may well prove an antidote to the social poison of the genocide."

Peter Hall